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Abstract. 
 
It is now over fifteen years since the Human Rights Act was enacted in November 1998.  
Although in legal terms it is difficult to argue with the proposition that the Act is working 
in an effective manner, in political terms the Act remains one of the most highly debated 
pieces of legislation on the UK statute books.  In recent years there have been numerous 
calls for the repeal of the Act, and for its replacement with a ‘UK Bill of Rights’.  Such 
calls led to the establishment of a Commission on a Bill of Rights, which issued its final 
report in December 2012.  Little progress has since been made on the issue.  One notable 
occurrence however was the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and 
Substitution) Bill, a Private Member’s Bill which was eventually withdrawn in March 
2013.  This article seeks to assess the current situation regarding the bill of rights debate, 
and ultimately the question of the future prospects of the Human Rights Act, an issue of 
immense legal significance.  Overall, it will be questioned whether the enactment of a 
UK Bill of Rights would constitute an improvement on the current position under the 
Human Rights Act.    
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The Human Rights Act 1998 – Future Prospects. 
 
 
Ronagh J.A. McQuigg.∗ 
 
 
 
The Human Rights Act 1998 is undoubtedly one of the most contentious pieces of 
legislation on the UK statute books.  Although many regard the Act as providing essential 
protection for the rights of individuals, it is also viewed in certain quarters as ‘a rogues’ 
charter’.  Indeed, there have been strong calls for the repeal of the Act, and for its 
replacement with what is commonly referred to as a ‘UK Bill of Rights’. The debate 
surrounding this issue culminated in the establishment of a Commission on a Bill of 
Rights, which issued its final report in December 2012.1  Little progress has since been 
made on the issue of a bill of rights.  One notable occurrence however was the 
introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill, a Private 
Member’s Bill which was eventually withdrawn in March 2013.  This article seeks to 
analyse the current situation regarding the bill of rights debate in the UK and the future 
prospects for the Human Rights Act.  Overall, it will be questioned whether the 
enactment of a UK Bill of Rights would constitute an improvement on the current 
position under the Human Rights Act.    
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1 The Commission on a Bill of Rights’ Report – A UK Bill of Rights? – The Choice Before Us, 18 December 
2012 
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The Political Context. 
 
The result of the general election of 2010 - a Coalition government consisting of 
the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Parties - gave rise to a particularly problematic 
situation as regards the question of the future of the Human Rights Act.  The 
Conservative Party manifesto had contained a pledge to ‘replace the Human Rights Act 
with a UK Bill of Rights’.  The Liberal Democrats however had stated in their manifesto 
that they would ‘ensure that everyone has the same protections under the law by 
protecting the Human Rights Act’.  After some delay, a compromise position was 
adopted, whereby a Commission was established in March 2011 with the mandate inter 
alia of investigating ‘the creation of a UK Bill of Rights that incorporates and builds on 
(the UK’s) obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, ensures that 
these rights continue to be enshrined in UK law, and protects and extends…liberties.’  It 
is notable that, even from the outset, this process suffered from a remarkable amount of 
incoherency.  Essentially, the primary reason for addressing the question of a UK Bill of 
Rights at that juncture was the Conservative Party’s belief that the Human Rights Act 
should be replaced.  However, the Commission’s mandate was to investigate the creation 
of a UK Bill of Rights to incorporate and build upon the UK’s obligations under the 
European Convention and ensure that these rights remain part of UK law.  According to 
this mandate, proposing a weaker instrument than the Human Rights Act was not an 
option.  Therefore, there was never any possibility that the Commission’s deliberations 
could produce a solution to the perceived problem.   
 
 4 
The Report of the Commission on a Bill of Rights.  
 
During the course of its deliberations, the Committee produced two consultation 
papers.  On each occasion approximately a quarter of respondents supported a UK Bill of 
Rights; just under half opposed such a Bill; with the remainder being neither clearly for 
or against.2  The majority of those who opposed a UK Bill of Rights did so on the basis 
that the UK already has a bill of rights, in the form of the Human Rights Act.  Many of 
the respondents who shared this view were of the opinion that the Act is working well 
and that it is ‘an effective and sophisticated piece of legislation’.3  In particular, there was 
‘considerable suspicion among many respondents that the call for a UK Bill of Rights 
from some political parties and politicians (was) motivated by a desire to reduce existing 
human rights protection’.4  In Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, calls for a UK Bill 
of Rights were ‘generally perceived to be emanating from England only and there was 
little if any criticism of the European Court of Human Rights or of the Convention.’5   
 
The Commission presented its final report on 18 December 2012.  In its report the 
Commission stated that there was ‘no doubt that the arguments that have been put to us 
against a UK Bill of Rights are substantial.’6  Nevertheless, despite the relatively low 
                                                 
2 The Commission on a Bill of Rights’ Report – A UK Bill of Rights? – The Choice Before Us, 18 December 
2012, Volume 1, p 14 
 
3 Ibid, p 14 
 
4 Ibid, p 15 
 
5 Ibid, pp 18-19 
 
6 Ibid, p 26 
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levels of support for a Bill of Rights, seven of the Commission's nine members were of 
the view that there was a strong argument in favour of a Bill of Rights to incorporate and 
build upon the UK's obligations under the European Convention.  The primary reason for 
the support of the majority of the Commission for a Bill of Rights was a perceived ‘lack 
of public understanding and “ownership” of the Human Rights Act’.7  For the members 
of the Commission who supported a UK Bill of Rights, it would therefore be ‘desirable in 
principle if such a Bill was written in language which reflected the distinctive history and 
heritage of the countries within the United Kingdom’, as the ‘key argument’ in favour of 
a Bill of Rights was ‘the need to create greater public ownership of a UK Bill of Rights 
than currently attaches to the Human Rights Act’.8     
  
Would a UK Bill of Rights improve on the Human Rights Act? 
 
Two members of the Commission – Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws and 
Philippe Sands – were however of the view that the time was not ripe for the conclusion 
to be reached that a new UK Bill of Rights should be enacted.  Their primary reason for 
disagreeing with the approach of the majority was the fact that the majority had failed to 
identify any actual shortcomings in the Human Rights Act or in its application by the 
judiciary.  Essentially the problem which the majority of the Commission perceived to 
exist was not with the Act itself, but with the way in which it is viewed by certain 
sections of the public.  Indeed, from a legal perspective, the Act is working in an 
                                                 
7 Ibid, p 28 
 
8 Ibid, p 30 
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effective manner.  As Harvey comments, the Human Rights Act ‘has been carefully and 
steadily absorbed into the legal system of the UK and a strong case can be made for its 
retention and the security of its place in the constitutional order.’9     
     
It is true that the Human Rights Act has not reached ‘the iconic status of the 
American or South African bills of rights’.10  However, to hope that the Act would attain 
such a status was perhaps too lofty an aspiration.  The Constitution of the United States 
was drawn up in the wake of the American Declaration of Independence, which declared 
the separation of the 13 colonies from Great Britain.  Given this context, it is unsurprising 
that the US Constitution, and the rights contained therein, carry great symbolic 
importance.  Likewise, the bill of rights found in the South African Constitution was 
drawn up following the end of apartheid.  Given the history of the widespread human 
rights abuses which occurred in South Africa, it is again unsurprising that the South 
African bill of rights now holds an iconic status.  The Human Rights Act was enacted in a 
very different context to either of these examples.  It seems that it is rather more difficult 
for bills of rights drawn up in less turbulent circumstances to catch the imagination of the 
public.  The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act of 1990 is a case in point.  This Act was 
passed, not because of the occurrence of any prominent human rights abuses, but rather 
due to the impetus produced largely by the then Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer.  The 
New Zealand Act is similar in many ways to the UK’s Human Rights Act.  In particular, 
section 6 of the New Zealand statute places an obligation on the courts to interpret 
                                                 
9 C Harvey ‘Taking the next step? Achieving another Bill of Rights’ (2011) European Human Rights Law 
Review 24 at 25 
 
10 F Klug ‘A Bill of Rights: what for?’ in C Bryant, Towards a New Constitutional Settlement (London: 
The Smith Institute, 2007) 130 at 139 
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legislation consistently with a set of rights, within certain limits, in a manner similar to 
that of section 3 of the Human Rights Act.  There was no cross-party political support for 
the New Zealand Act, and the attitudes of the general public were apathetic at best.  It 
cannot be said that the Bill of Rights Act has ever reached iconic status in New Zealand 
however, 24 years after its inception, the Act is still in existence and proposals were in 
fact made to strengthen its provisions.11  Human rights instruments do not need to be 
iconic documents in order to survive and to be effective in protecting rights. 
 
In addition, given the constitutional context of the UK, it is unsurprising that the 
Human Rights Act has not gained an iconic status.  The UK’s constitutional structure is 
based on a liberal ideology.  The attitude to rights which was traditionally adopted was 
that of negative liberties ensuring individual freedoms.  Bills of rights do not fit well with 
such an approach, and indeed the Human Rights Act represented a substantial departure 
from such an ideology.  Interestingly, New Zealand has a very similar constitutional 
context to that of the UK and, as discussed above, its bill of rights has not attained an 
iconic status either.  Australia, another common law jurisdiction which again shares a 
similar constitutional heritage, does not have a bill of rights at the federal level.  
Essentially, to expect that a human rights instrument will achieve symbolic status in a 
country with a constitutional history such as that of the UK is perhaps to be overly 
optimistic.   
 
Another reason why the Human Rights Act has not achieved iconic status may be 
due to its own operative mechanisms.  The American and South African bills of rights 
                                                 
11 New Zealand Bill of Rights Amendment Bill 2010 
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both accord the respective judiciaries the power to strike down legislation which is 
incompatible with the rights contained therein.  It is not suggested that the Human Rights 
Act should be amended to allow the UK judges to do likewise.  Indeed, affording the 
judiciary such a power would be seen as anathema to many in the political sphere, and as 
contrary to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty which is the bedrock of the 
constitutional order of the UK.  However, the fact that the US and South African 
judiciaries have the power to strike down legislation which is incompatible with human 
rights standards gives the respective bills of rights something of a dramatic flourish, 
which is significantly more likely to catch the imagination of the public than is the 
declaration of incompatibility mechanism found in section 4 of the Human Rights Act.  
Of course, that is not to denigrate this mechanism in any way.  Indeed, the respondents to 
the Commission’s consultations were widely of the view that section 4 of the Human 
Rights Act is operating in a successful manner, and the majority of the Commission was 
of the opinion that a similar mechanism should be utilised in a UK Bill of Rights.   
However, the very fact that this mechanism had to be created in order to address the 
difficulty of how to reconcile a human rights instrument with the constitutional context of 
the UK adds weight to the proposition that it may be immensely difficult for the Human 
Rights Act (or indeed any UK Bill of Rights) to achieve a status equivalent to that of the 
US or South African bills of rights.   
 
However, the fact that the Human Rights Act has not achieved iconic status does 
not mean that it has insufficient support.  It seems that levels of opposition to the Human 
Rights Act have in fact been significantly overestimated.  According to the findings of 
 9 
the Commission’s consultations, it appears that any ‘ownership’ issue is limited to certain 
parts of England, and does not therefore create a difficulty in the majority of the UK.  In a 
separate paper produced by the two members of the Commission who did not support a 
UK Bill of Rights, it is stated that the consultations demonstrated in fact that there was 
‘overwhelming support to retain the system established by the Human Rights Act’.12  
Indeed 96 per cent of participants were of the view that the Human Rights Act should be 
retained.13  This paper proceeded to state that,  
it is abundantly clear that there is no ‘ownership’ issue in Northern Ireland, Wales 
and Scotland (or, it would appear, across large parts of England), where the 
existing arrangements under the Human Rights Act and the European Convention 
on Human Rights are not merely tolerated but strongly supported.14    
 
It seems that rather than attempting to create a new UK Bill of Rights with all the 
attendant difficulties, a better and more straightforward solution would be to carry out 
education campaigns regarding the Human Rights Act in the parts of England where an 
‘ownership’ problem is deemed to exist.  This would constitute a more logical approach 
than that of attempting to produce a UK Bill of Rights when there is clear opposition to 
such a measure among some sections of the population, particularly in the devolved 
nations.  If the key argument for a UK Bill of Rights is a lack of ‘ownership’ of the 
Human Rights Act, the fact that only 25 per cent of the respondents to the Commission’s 
                                                 
12 Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws and P Sands, ‘In Defence of Rights’ in The Commission on a Bill of 
Rights’ Report – A UK Bill of Rights? – The Choice Before Us, 18 December 2012, Volume 1, 221 at 225. 
 
13 Ibid, p 225 
 
14 Ibid, p 226 
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consultations were in favour of a Bill of Rights does not lead one to believe that a Bill of 
Rights would engender any greater sense of ‘ownership’ than has the Human Rights Act.  
The Commission itself stated in its report that there was 
a strong strand in response to our consultations that even if there were, and are, 
problems or perceived problems with the Human Rights Act, or its adjudication 
by the courts, these have largely been caused by a lack of public education, and 
could be addressed accordingly.15     
For example, the British Institute of Human Rights commented in its response to the 
consultation that,  
rather than reinventing the wheel with a Bill of Rights, we believe the 
Commission should focus on recommending the need for an appropriate and 
accessible programme for public education on human rights and the (Human 
Rights Act) to show that the law works and is working well.16 
 
In addition, as regards the elements of the public among whom an ‘ownership’ 
problem is deemed to exist, it is arguable that negative attitudes may be linked to the 
concept of ‘human rights’, as opposed to the Human Rights Act specifically.  A 
proportion of members of the public may well be of the opinion that ‘human rights’ 
create advantages for the ‘undeserving’ in society, such as terrorist suspects.  However, it 
is likely that a large percentage of the general public do not actually have a high level of 
substantive knowledge of the Human Rights Act itself, such as precisely what rights are 
                                                 
15 The Commission on a Bill of Rights’ Report – A UK Bill of Rights? – The Choice Before Us, above n 1, p 
16 
 
16 Ibid, p 29 
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contained therein.  According to the Bill of Rights Commission’s report, the primary 
purpose of a UK Bill of Rights would essentially be to change the wording of the rights 
currently contained in the Human Rights Act to make them more reflective of ‘the 
distinctive history and heritage of the countries within the United Kingdom.’17  However, 
if it is the case that the majority of the public are unaware of precisely what their rights 
are, let alone how these rights are currently expressed, how will changing the wording 
have any effect whatsoever?  Conversely, if the public are aware of the content of their 
rights under the Human Rights Act, the assumption that ‘cosmetic’ changes to the 
wording of these rights will somehow create a greater degree of public ‘ownership’ of the 
rights in question verges on constituting an insult to the intelligence of the general public.  
Of course, other problematic questions also arise, such as how does one distil ‘the 
distinctive history and heritage’ of the UK, for the purposes of a UK Bill of Rights, from 
the different heritages of the various nations within the UK?  Even if this task is 
accomplished, how does one then go about drafting a Bill of Rights that is reflective of 
this ‘distinctive history and heritage’?         
 
Given that the consultation carried out by the Commission found that there is in 
fact very considerable opposition to a UK Bill of Rights, the obvious question that arises 
is why then did the majority of the Commission support such a Bill of Rights?  In their 
separate paper, Baroness Kennedy and Philippe Sands commented that,  
in the course of our deliberations it became evident that a number of (Commission 
members) would like the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European 
                                                 
17 Ibid, p 30 
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Convention….(T)he unambiguous expression of such views offered openly in the 
course of our deliberations has made it clear to us that for some of our colleagues 
a UK Bill of Rights is a means towards withdrawal from the European 
Convention.18  
Two of the other Commission members, Lord Faulks and Jonathan Fisher produced a 
separate paper entitled ‘Unfinished Business’ in which they stated that, ‘there are strong 
arguments that the cause of human rights, both in the UK and internationally, would be 
better served by withdrawal from the Convention and the enactment of a domestic Bill of 
Rights’.19  There is undoubtedly a section of the Conservative Party which believes 
strongly that the UK should leave the Convention, due to decisions of the European Court 
on issues such as prisoners’ voting rights.20  Under article 65 of the European 
Convention, the UK could denounce its adherence to the Convention after giving six 
months notice of its intention to do so.  However, it is debatable whether such a 
development would ever constitute a politically viable option.  Given the high levels of 
support for the Human Rights Act which the Bill of Rights Commission found in its 
consultations, it is very doubtful whether such a move would prove to be popular among 
the public.  Also, it is likely that leaving the Convention would make the UK the subject 
of potentially damaging criticism on an international level, and to allegations of 
insufficient respect for human rights standards. 
 
                                                 
18 Baroness Kennedy and P Sands, above n 12, pp 226-227 
 
19 Lord Faulks and J Fisher ‘Unfinished Business’ in The Commission on a Bill of Rights’ Report – A UK 
Bill of Rights? – The Choice Before Us, 18 December 2012, Volume 1, 182 at 189 
 
20 For example, Hirst v the United Kingdom (No. 2), app. no. 74025/01, 6 October 2005; Greens and M.T. v 
the United Kingdom, app. nos. 60041/08 and 60054/08, 11 April 2011 
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The Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill.                          
 
In 2012 Fenwick remarked that, ‘The appetite of a number of senior 
Conservatives for repeal of the (Human Rights Act) and diminution of Strasbourg 
influence appears undiminished, even enhanced, in the context of the Coalition.’21  This 
fact is clearly illustrated by the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and 
Substitution) Bill by Charlie Elphicke, the Conservative Member of Parliament for Dover 
and Deal.  The Bill was also supported by 11 other Conservative MPs.  Although the Bill 
was later withdrawn, an examination of its contents is nevertheless instructive as the Bill 
demonstrates the level of opposition among certain sections of the Conservative Party to 
the Human Rights Act. 
 
Section 16 of the Bill stated that, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 is repealed’, while 
under section 17, no provision of the European Convention, judgment of the European 
Court, opinion or decision of the European Commission of Human Rights or decision of 
the Committee of Ministers taken under the Convention would be regarded as binding on 
any person or on any public authority.  As regards what would be put in the place of the 
Human Rights Act, the Bill set out a catalogue of rights (referred to in the Bill as ‘UK 
rights’) and also a very limited number of responsibilities.  The operative mechanisms of 
the Bill contained strong similarities to those of the Human Rights Act, which reflects the 
                                                 
21 H Fenwick ‘Replacing the Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights: Creating greater 
Parliamentary autonomy on human rights matters?’ in N Kang-Riou, J Milner and S Nayak (eds) 
Confronting the Human Rights Act: Contemporary Themes and Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2012) 
291 at 325 
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finding of the Bill of Rights Commission that the mechanisms contained in the Act are 
working effectively.   
 
Section 2(1) of the Bill stated that when determining a question which has arisen 
in connection with a UK right, a court ‘may take account of’ judgments of the courts in 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States of America or any country having a 
common law-based judicial system; the European Court of Human Rights; or a court in 
any other jurisdiction which may be relevant to the UK right under consideration.  This 
provision contained similarities to section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act, which states 
that the courts ‘must take into account’ the judgments of the European Court.  However, 
under the Bill, although the UK judiciary would be permitted to take account of the 
judgments of the courts listed, there would be no actual obligation to do so.  Also, and 
most obviously, the proposed section 2(1) potentially covered the jurisprudence of all 
courts outside of the UK, with no especial position being afforded to the jurisprudence of 
the European Court.   
 
Section 2(2) of the Bill stated that,  
A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a 
UK right shall take into account all the facts and circumstances of the case, 
including the conduct of the person seeking to assert the UK right (including his 
adherence to the responsibilities set out in Article 23 of Schedule 1) and whether 
it is fair, equitable and in the interests of justice for such UK right to be applied in 
relation to the question at hand. 
 15 
This provision sought to link the entitlement to rights to the exercise of responsibilities, 
and envisages situations in which courts may decide that a right should not be applied, 
essentially due to the conduct of the person seeking to rely on the right.  It is however 
doubtful whether such a provision would ever receive sufficient support to be enacted, 
given that the majority of respondents to the consultations carried out by the Bill of 
Rights Commission indicated that they were of the view that rights should not be linked 
to the exercise of responsibilities.  It is also doubtful whether the courts would apply a 
somewhat vaguely drafted provision such as this in a manner as to prevent individuals 
from relying on rights, as such an approach would be contrary to internationally accepted 
human rights principles.  No guidance was given on how the courts should take into 
account the conduct of the person seeking to assert the right, and it is difficult to imagine 
that there would be a great many cases in which the courts would hold that it would be 
unfair to apply a right.  From a purely pragmatic perspective therefore, it is unlikely that 
such a provision would make any great difference to the outcomes of cases.  
Nevertheless, from a theoretical perspective, linking the entitlement to rights with 
conduct in this manner strikes at the very heart of the foundations of human rights in a 
deeply troubling manner. 
 
As in the Human Rights Act, section 3 of the Bill related to the interpretation of 
legislation by the courts.  Section 3(1) stated that, ‘When reading and giving effect to 
legislation in light of the UK rights, the words and sentences of legislation must be 
construed in accordance with their ordinary and natural meaning.’  Section 3(2) provided 
that, ‘Where the meaning of legislation arrived at in accordance with subsection (1) is 
 16 
ambiguous, it may be presumed that a possible meaning that is compatible with the UK 
rights was intended, unless the contrary intention appears.’  The Bill therefore adopted a 
much more restrictive approach as to the interpretation of statutes in accordance with 
rights than does section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act, which states that, ‘So far as it is 
possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given 
effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.’  A fairly liberal 
approach has been taken by the courts to section 3(1), with the seminal case on 
interpretation being that of Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza.22  However, under section 3(1) of 
the Bill, legislative provisions would have to be construed in accordance with their 
ordinary meaning, with the question of a possible rights-consistent interpretation only 
arising if there is ambiguity.  Indeed, this is the approach that the UK courts currently 
take towards the provisions of international treaties that are not incorporated into 
domestic law.  It seems somewhat odd that so-called ‘UK rights’ would not be afforded a 
higher status under the Bill.  Section 4 of the Bill contains a declaration of 
incompatibility mechanism, which is very similar to that found in section 4 of the Human 
Rights Act.  It is however likely that this mechanism would be used much more 
frequently by the courts under the Bill than is currently the case under the Human Rights 
Act, due to the extremely limited circumstances in which section 3(2) could be used.  If a 
declaration of incompatibility is issued, it is up to Parliament to decide whether the 
legislation in question should be amended to make it compatible with rights, as opposed 
to the courts simply applying a rights-consistent interpretation using the interpretative 
                                                 
22 [2004] UKHL 30 
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obligation.  Therefore, the Bill would decrease the role of the courts, relative to 
Parliament, as regards human rights issues.   
 
Section 7(1) of the Bill stated that, ‘It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a 
way which could not reasonably be regarded, in all the facts and circumstances of the 
case, as compatible with the UK rights.’  This provision would raise the threshold for a 
finding of unlawfulness from that which is currently applied by the courts under section 
6(1) of the Human Rights Act, which states that, ‘It is unlawful for a public authority to 
act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.’  Indeed the reference to 
reasonableness brings to mind the Wednesbury23 standard which is applied in judicial 
review cases which do not involve the Human Rights Act.  Section 8 of the Bill provided 
a right of action for breach of the duty on public authorities which is broadly similar to 
that contained in section 7 of the Human Rights Act.  Section 9(1) of the Bill stated that, 
In relation to any act of a public authority which the court finds is unlawful, it 
may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it 
considers just and appropriate, unless the act was reasonable with regard to all the 
circumstances, including a reasonable understanding of primary or subordinate 
legislation applying to the public authority concerned. 
The equivalent provision of the Human Rights Act is found in section 8(1), which states, 
‘In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public authority which the court finds is (or 
would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, within its 
powers as it considers just and appropriate.’  It is notable that the caveat placed on 
                                                 
23 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn. [1948] 1 KB 223 
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section 9(1) of the Bill appears to be superfluous.  Section 9(1) would only come into 
operation if a court has already found that a public authority has acted in a way which 
could not reasonably be regarded as compatible with the UK rights, and that the public 
authority in question was not caused to act in such a manner by provisions of primary or 
subordinate legislation.24  It would seem peculiar if the court then decided that the actions 
of the public authority were in fact reasonable for the purposes of section 9(1). 
 
Section 11 of the Bill contained a power for Ministers of the Crown to take 
remedial action in respect of legislation declared under section 4 to be incompatible with 
UK rights.  This mechanism is broadly similar to that found in section 10 of the Human 
Rights Act.  Sections 13 and 14 of the Bill contained particular provisions relating to 
freedom of expression and freedom of thought, conscience and religion which are almost 
identical to those found in sections 12 and 13 of the Human Rights Act.  Section 15 of the 
Bill would place an obligation on a Minister of the Crown who is introducing legislation 
to make either a statement that the provisions of the legislation are compatible with the 
UK rights, or a statement that the government nevertheless wishes to proceed with the 
legislation in the event of incompatibility.  This procedure is identical to that of the 
making of statements of compatibility with the Convention rights under section 19 of the 
Human Rights Act. 
 
The rights and responsibilities themselves were found in Schedule 1 to the Bill.  
The rights listed were heavily based on those found in the European Convention, and 
                                                 
24 Section 7(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill 2013 
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indeed the wording used was for the large part identical to that of the Convention rights.  
The differences between the rights in the Bill and the Convention rights tended to be 
related to issues which have been discussed by the media in the UK in recent times.  For 
example, two provisos were added to the right to free elections, whereby this right ‘shall 
not entitle a person to vote in an election if that person is in detention under the sentence 
of a court handed down for a criminal offence’,25 and ‘shall not entitle a person to vote in 
an election if they are not a British citizen.’26  Article 18 of the Schedule would afford 
British citizens a right to challenge extradition.  However under article 22(2), ‘No person 
who is not a British citizen may rely on any Article in this Schedule to delay, hinder or 
avoid deportation or other removal from the United Kingdom.’  Article 22(3) stated that,  
A public authority may take such action in relation to a person as it believes to be 
appropriate in the interests of national security or public safety if it reasonably 
believes that there is a clear and present danger to national security or public 
safety presented any that person; but such action shall not include deprivation of 
life...or torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (though, for the 
avoidance of doubt, such action may include extradition or other removal from 
the United Kingdom).    
Article 16(1) provided that,  
In a dwelling, a person…has the right to use force against someone for the 
purpose of defending himself or others from violence or a sexual crime or for 
protecting property from crime, where he believes the person he uses force 
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against is in or entering the dwelling as a trespasser; but the force used must not 
be grossly disproportionate in the circumstances that he believes exist. 
However, article 16(2) stated that, ‘This Article applies in England and Wales only.’  It 
certainly seems that affording a right to persons in only particular parts of the UK would 
be problematic, given the fact that human rights are based upon the principle of 
universality!   
 
A short list of responsibilities was found in article 23.  The duties encompassed 
were obeying the law; rendering civil or military service when this is required for the 
country’s defence; supporting, nurturing and protecting one’s children; respecting and 
upholding basic public order; seeking to support oneself without recourse to a public 
authority; and rendering help to other persons who are in need of assistance, where 
reasonable and to the best of one’s ability.  Overall, very little attention was given to the 
concept of responsibilities in the Bill.  Although it is a much repeated argument that 
rights should ‘go hand in hand’ with responsibilities, linking the two concepts is in 
practice problematic.  One of the reasons for this difficulty is that the very essence of 
human rights is that rights are afforded to individuals simply by virtue of the fact that 
they are human beings.  The virtuosity or otherwise of their conduct is irrelevant.  
Attempting therefore to link the entitlement of an individual to human rights to the 
exercise of responsibilities is, at the most basic level, incompatible with the principles 
which form the very foundation of the human rights discourse.  Thus when those seeking 
to connect rights with responsibilities actually attempt to draft a legislative instrument in 
this vein, it seems that the product tends to be simply a bill of rights with very few 
 21 
meaningful references to the concept of responsibilities.  For example, a Charter of 
Rights and Responsibilities Act was passed in the Australian state of Victoria in 2006.  
However, although the term ‘responsibilities’ is included in the title of the legislation, 
there is very little reference to the concept of ‘responsibilities’ in the Charter’s 
substantive provisions. 
 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill was withdrawn 
following the second reading debate in March 2013.  Nevertheless, the very fact that such 
a detailed Private Member’s Bill was introduced is evidence in itself of the deep 
dissatisfaction within certain sections of the Conservative Party regarding the 
incorporation of the Convention rights into domestic law by the Human Rights Act.  
Although there are great similarities between the Bill and the existing Human Rights Act, 
there are nevertheless aspects of the Bill which are deeply problematic, such as the 
inclusion of provisions which are in direct conflict with cases of the European Court, 
such the decisions in Chahal and Hirst.  In the Parliamentary debate on the Bill, Elphicke 
commented that it was drafted ‘in such a way as to leave it open to the Executive to 
decide whether they wished to remain party to the Convention or to withdraw from it 
altogether.’27  However, the enactment of provisions which directly conflict with 
jurisprudence of the European Court would in fact make the UK’s continued membership 
of the European Convention untenable.   
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Future Prospects. 
 
The question of a UK Bill of Rights remains in a state of uncertainty.  Although 
there is a strong element of the Conservative Party which would wish to repeal the 
Human Rights Act, the hands of the Conservatives are tied by the fact that they are in a 
Coalition government with a party which has the stated aim of protecting the Act.  
Although the Bill of Rights Commission’s report was in favour of a UK Bill of Rights, 
this recommendation was made on the understanding that such an instrument would 
incorporate the UK's existing obligations under the European Convention, and that it 
would provide no less protection than is contained in the current Human Rights Act.  
During debate on the Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill, the Minister 
for Policing and Justice stated that, ‘the Government remain committed to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and to ensuring that those rights continue to be enshrined 
in UK law.’28  Therefore a UK Bill of Rights which contains less than the current level of 
protection is not an option.          
 
Equally it seems that a Bill of Rights containing more than the current level of 
protection is not an option either.  Given the current levels of Conservative opposition to 
the Act as it stands, it is very unlikely that sufficient support would be found for adding 
to or strengthening the existing catalogue of rights.  In addition, from a purely pragmatic 
perspective, it is difficult to imagine firm conclusions being reached as to what any 
additional rights should actually be.  As Klug comments, the Human Rights Act already 
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includes ‘all the standard rights present in bills of rights the world over.’29  There was 
certainly no agreement among the respondents to the Commission’s consultations who 
gave their views on this issue.  Indeed, the Bill of Rights Commission itself was unable to 
reach agreement on the possible content of a UK Bill of Rights.  In their separate paper, 
Baroness Kennedy and Philippe Sands commented that, 
We find it difficult to imagine how agreement could be reached on the idea of a 
UK Bill of Rights, even in principle, when views are so polarised as to what such 
an instrument might contain.  In our view, it would be preferable for form to 
follow substance, and for any move as to whether there should be a new UK Bill 
of Rights…to await a time when there is a reasonable degree of consensus as to 
what such a Bill might contain.30   
It is difficult to disagree with this statement.  There seems to be little point in deciding 
that there should be a UK Bill of Rights and then attempting to find rights, additional to 
those found in the European Convention, which garner a sufficient degree of public 
support to merit inclusion, essentially with the sole purpose of justifying the creation of a 
Bill of Rights.   
 
Even the comments of the members of the Commission who supported a UK Bill 
of Rights give the impression that they thought it unlikely that any moves would be made 
on the issue in the near future.  All of the Commission’s members recognised that, ‘To 
come to pass successfully a UK Bill of Rights would have to respect the different 
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political and legal traditions within all of the countries of the UK, and to command public 
confidence beyond party politics and ideology.’31  Given the current lack of support for a 
UK Bill of Rights particularly within the devolved nations, as demonstrated by the results 
of the Commission’s consultations, it seems extremely unlikely that such a consensus 
could in reality be attained in the near future, if at all.  All of the members of the 
Commission were of the view that any future debate on the issue must be sensitive to 
issues of devolution.  In particular, it would be essential to await the outcome of the 
independence referendum in Scotland before making any final decisions on the creation 
of a UK Bill of Rights.  The Minister for Policing and Justice later commented in the 
course of Parliamentary debates that ‘it is difficult to fault the logic of that conclusion, 
which provides a persuasive reason as to why now is not the time to embark on wholesale 
changes to the human rights framework.’32 
 
Conclusion.  
 
In conclusion therefore, it is highly probable that the Human Rights Act will 
continue in its present form, at least for the foreseeable future.  It has been stated by the 
Bill of Rights Commission, and accepted by the Government, that steps should not be 
taken as regards any UK Bill of Rights until after the referendum on Scottish 
independence.  Even beyond the referendum, it is doubtful whether a UK Bill of Rights 
will come to fruition.  According to the Commission’s report, the key argument for the 
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creation of a UK Bill of Rights is a perceived lack of public ‘ownership’ of the Human 
Rights Act.  However, the Commission’s consultations found that there is in fact no 
widespread problem of this nature, and that any such ‘ownership’ issue is restricted to 
certain parts of England.  It seems that the implementation of education campaigns on the 
Human Rights Act in the areas in question would constitute a more logical approach than 
attempting to enact a UK Bill of Rights Act, particularly when the Commission found 
that there is substantial opposition to such a measure.  Even if there were an ‘ownership’ 
problem, it is unlikely that the type of Bill of Rights suggested by the Commission, based 
primarily on changing the wording of the Convention rights, would ameliorate the 
situation.   
 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Government’s official position is that it 
remains committed to the rights contained in the European Convention and to ensuring 
that those rights remain enshrined in UK law, there are sections of the Conservative Party 
which are strongly opposed to the continued incorporation of the Convention rights.  The 
strength of this opposition may be seen in the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(Repeal and Substitution) Bill.  However, the key point is that the cause of the rules 
which are perceived as problematic is not the Human Rights Act, but rather the case law 
of the European Court, which would be binding on the UK regardless of the existence of 
the Act.  If the objection is to the decisions of the Court in cases such as Chahal and 
Hirst, the replacement of the Human Rights Act with a UK Bill of Rights will never 
provide a solution.      
 
